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Canadians know very little about the roleplayed by their countrymen in Sicily sixty
years ago. In their popular history of the Second
World War, historians Brereton Greenhous and
W.A.B. Douglas summed up our performance
this way:
The Canadians were beset by problems of
command and control. Some of their
inexperienced regimental officers responded
uncertainly to the concentrated pressure of
battle, maps were read wrongly, and their radios
too often failed them at vital moments. On the
positive side, however, they had courage, tenacity,
and the hard-driving energy of their commander
to carry them through, plus an enormous weight
of fire power…1
Such an assessment resonates with the tone of
the army’s official historian, C.P. Stacey, whose
judgments on the performance of Canadian army
officers in Normandy were strikingly similar.2
In both theatres, it seems that inexperienced
regimental officers were saved by General Guy
Simonds and lots of artillery.
The Sicilian campaign takes on a very
different hue when viewed from those who
actually did the fighting. Memoirs, after-action
reports and regimental histories reveal a host
of challenges faced by the Canadian army even
before it landed on the beaches near Pachino.
In the daunting terrain and climate of that
Sicilian summer, it is equally clear that firepower
was not enough. Leadership mattered and,
despite their inexperience, Canadian officers
demonstrated it.
In May 1943, after three and a half months
fighting in North Africa with the British 8th Army,
Captain Strome Galloway rejoined the Royal
Canadian Regiment, (RCR) then training in
Ayrshire, Scotland. It was a far different unit
than the one he had left: “New equipment was
much in evidence, new weapons caught the eye.”
Galloway took command of the RCR’s “B”
Company. Captain Charles Lithgow was his
Second-in-Command and a friend, but he knew
none of his three subalterns, “two recent RMC
products direct from Canada and a very
unmilitary but comical chap who had been some
sort of man-about-town before the war, and was
also a new arrival.”3
New battalion establishments only added to
the confusion of the Canadian units overseas.
In January 1943, the 31 (soon to be 33) infantry
battalions lost their anti-aircraft platoon and one
of the four rifle companies. The news in late
January that “D” Company of the 48th
Highlanders was to be disbanded “stunned” and
outraged the men for whom their company was
such a source of pride. Three months later came
orders to reintroduce the fourth rifle company.
This reversal increased the battalion
establishment to 37 officers and 811 other
ranks. The first parade of the 48th Highlanders’
‘new’ “D” Company came just hours before the
unit’s departure from Eastbourne for Scotland.
A new company march, Donald’s Return from
the War, helped soften the impact of yet another
change in establishment.4
The new battalion establishments came in
April 1943 at the same time as Canada accepted
an invitation to take part in Operation Husky,
the invasion of Sicily. The 1st Division and 1st
Armoured Brigade were soon to become part of
the British 8th Army. Time was short. The units
of 1st Division had been in England since late
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21939, and though its early training was often
described as casual, the pace of what one unit
called “the New Training” had since 1941 paid
handsome dividends.5 But handling new
weapons just weeks before the Canadians were
to embark for Sicily must have been daunting.
The Canadians were in Scotland for their final
assault training when they were first issued the
Thompson submachine gun in place of the Sten
gun. The fickle PIAT (Projector, Infantry Anti-
Tank) replaced the much-hated Boyes anti-tank
rifle. While the infantry anti-tank platoons
exchanged their 2-pounder guns for 6-pounders,
the divisional 1st Anti-tank Regiment traded up
half its 6-pounders for the 17-pounder gun. For
the Ontario, Three Rivers and Calgary Tank
Regiments of 1st Armoured Brigade, the
Sherman tank took over from the
Canadian-built Ram, which had in
turn replaced the Churchill tank
earlier in the year.6
Even in an ideal world, a well-
trained soldier needed some time to
learn the eccentricities of the
‘Tommy gun’, the 17-pounder or the
Sherman. (Everyone likely needed
much more practice with the PIAT.)
It also took time to learn how these
new weapons would work together.
The division had no time. In July
an amphibious assault loomed on a
beach some 2,000 miles and two
weeks distant. Of all the units that
would make up the assault force in
Husky, only the Canadians would
arrive from so far afield.
More than any other unit in First
Canadian Army, 1st Division’s senior
leadership mirrored the Canadian
Army’s roots in both the permanent
force and the militia. After the
divisional commander, Major-
General Harry Salmon, was killed
in an aircraft accident enroute to
Egypt in April 1943, 39-year-old
Major-General Guy Granville
Simonds took over. Simonds’
reputation as an innovative
commander began in Sicily, but so
did his often-difficult relations with his
subordinates. Howard Graham had fought in the
First World War and risen through the pre-war
militia before he took command of 1st Brigade
in 1942. It included the Royal Canadian
Regiment (Permanent Force), Graham’s own
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment and
Toronto’s 48th Highlanders of Canada. Graham’s
militia background likely cooled his relationship
with Simonds. By some accounts only the
intervention of 8th Army Commander Bernard
Law Montgomery prevented Simonds from
sacking Graham early in the campaign.7
Simonds had better dealings with his other two
brigade commanders. Chris Vokes of 2nd
Brigade was a permanent force engineering
officer. His ‘Western’ Brigade contained the
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3Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
(Permanent Force), The Seaforth Highlanders of
Canada from Vancouver, and The Edmonton
Regiment. Howard Penhale was also a career
soldier. His 3rd Brigade was raised in Eastern
Canada and included the Royal 22e Régiment
(Permanent Force), The Carleton and York
Regiment (CYRs) from New Brunswick, and The
West Nova Scotia Regiment.
Richard Malone was the Brigade Major for
Vokes’s 2nd Brigade before he was wounded
near Assoro. Malone maintains that each
battalion looked “down its nose slightly at its
sister formations.” The Patricias, being a
Permanent Force [PF] unit, “stood very much on
its dignity, quite convinced as P.F. soldiers they
were much smarter and more professional than
the Militia men or part time soldiers in the
Seaforths or Edmontons.” The Seaforths “were
rather the gay social boys. In their kilts and with
their peacetime status, one seemed always to
detect a slight disdain of the queer P.F. bunch in
the Patricias and the rough lads with foreign
names in the Edmontons, many of whom had
been recruited from the mines and bush country
of the north and the wide farms of the prairies.”
Malone felt the Edmontons considered
themselves “tougher than the other two
regiments…felt they could outmarch them and
do a better job when it actually came to a scrap.”
After several weeks in action, however, Malone
felt that such ‘weird notions’ gave way to a pride
in the division.8
Regimental rivalries never disappeared
completely. While the Permanent Force and
Highland battalions coveted their traditions, the
rest of the division’s militia units – the
Edmontons, the Hastings and Prince Edwards
Regiment (Hasty P’s), the Carleton and York
Regiment, and the West Nova Scotia Regiment –
exuded a fierce, almost disdainful pride drawn
from their rural, regional background. The Hasty
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4P’s, for example, relished their nickname the
‘plough jockeys’ and the tough-guy attitude it
conveyed. Regimental funds were limited in rural
or small town militia units, so, like the CYRs,
each “learned to make the best of what it had,
an attitude frequently put into words by one of
the wartime COs, Lt Col Walter Lawson:
‘Improvise, damn it.’”9
Certainly these attitudes helped determine
how the division’s junior officers would lead their
men. Permanent Force officers like Simonds
worried that militia officers like Graham were
too used to a democratic form of decision-
making. In the view of Simonds’ biographer, such
a “communal approach [to planning]…was
discouraged for it admitted amateur rather than
orthodox solutions and sometimes, when troops
were tired, served to gentle them and even setup
a tacit live-and-let-live arrangement with the
enemy.” Some militia officers, on the other hand,
believed that too many PF officers were
promoted simply because they were from the
Permanent Force.10 Others were considered
martinets. Galloway recalled Lieutenant-Colonel
Ralph Crowe of the RCRs and his Second-in-
Command, Major J.H.W.T. Pope as “intense
people and perfectionists.…” Galloway recalled
years later that “They treated the junior officers
as though they were pupils in a boys’ school and
they instituted numerous madcap schemes to
keep everyone on tiptoe. Actually, they were good
for the battalion. They got our fighting spirit up
to the point where we longed for the day of battle
so we could get away from all the criticism we
incurred for not meeting their standards.”11
In April 1943, Lieutenant Sydney Frost
arrived in England and was posted with four
others to the Patricias. He took command of 17
Platoon, 3 Company. (Infantry battalions had not
yet reorganized to their final establishment of
four rifle companies.) Frost received a brief
welcome from Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Lindsay,
but he remembers being “a small cog in a very
active Regiment, just off a gruelling exercise.
Everyone was busy with his own duties and had
no time to nurse a newly joined subaltern,
particularly one just arrived from Canada.”
Frost’s fellow officers were cool initially, though
he recognized the small group of majors and
captains who already formed the core of the
regiment. The army had long told its young
officers to observe their seniors and imitate their
leadership style. The Patricia’s officers offered
several models. Ron Watterman was formerly an
NCO in the permanent force. Frost remembers
that he had developed “a reputation as a very
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Men from the 1st Canadian Infantry Division walk along a road during the advance to Ispica, 12 July 1943. They display
the liberal interpretation of uniform regulations adopted by Canadian troops in Sicily. Note the donkey carts on the right.
These were generally commandeered to haul heavy weapons and other equipment and supplies.
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5tough customer, particularly on junior officers.
Everyone was scared of him, including some of
the senior officers, not only because of his abrupt
and intimidating manner but because he knew
his stuff and was a highly professional soldier.”12
Watterman would later take command of the
West Nova Scotia Regiment.
Major Cameron Ware followed a different
route to a commission and practiced a different
leadership style. An RMC graduate who had
joined the Patricias in 1935, Ware had had a
stint with the British army before he rejoined
the Patricias in 1940 and became its Second-in-
Command the next year. Ware was one of those
self-assured, charismatic leaders who “inspired
confidence in his men.”13 He would become the
Patricias’ Commanding Officer in August 1943.
 As products of the pre-war permanent force,
Crowe, Pope and Watterman represented a
leadership style that few wartime officers had
the confidence and skill to copy. Trained outside
of a fiercely competitive regimental system, new
officers nevertheless had to lead within it. Until
they could prove themselves, outsiders were best
to tread warily for the consequences could be
severe. Most new officers had likely heard of the
‘sit-down’ strike the men of the Cape Breton
Highlanders had staged to protest the arrival of
new officers from ‘away’. As Cederberg relates,
the other ranks had ways to take revenge on
“specific officers they wouldn’t or couldn’t
accept”:
One way was to go to mess in long lines, precisely
when a ‘target’ officer was returning to his
quarters. Every soldier would salute him,
making him return each one separately until his
arm was ready to fall off. Another was to steal
his revolver and throw it into a nearby pond. It
was kind of comical to see one of them, out on
the pond late in the afternoon, dragging and
probing for a service.14
A strenuous route march finally won over the
other ranks to the strength and character of their
officers:
Colonel Weir and 2/I-C [Second-in-Command]
Major Sommerville walked with the men,
striding out, singing along, tirelessly. In fact,
Sommerville, whose battle-dress trousers were
slightly too large for his ass, was tagged Pete the
Tramp for the way he walked despite blisters.
But it was Majors Laird Nesbitt and Bill Ogilvy
who extinguished the last embers of resentment.
They provided barrels of good mild and bitters
for the marching men at the end of the sixth
day.
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6Later Cederberg recalled an informal visit
from Major Sommerville. “‘Competition,’ snorted
Pete the Tramp, one afternoon when he dropped
around unannounced to inspect the platoon
carriers, ‘that’s what does it. But you have to
instill it on a company versus company level
here, regiment against regiment, then division
against division. Why? Well, we’re at war, even if
we aren’t fighting.’ He grinned under his thick
black moustache. ‘Looking back, I guess I tried
too hard, too fast.’ The platoon laughed, easily.
He’d scored a point while conceding another.’”15
The informal relationship between officers
and men that Cederberg describes was typical
of the kind that evolved in the Canadian militia.
But Frost’s platoon of soldiers in the Patricias
demanded similar treatment. They “were a tough
bunch. They knew all the tricks of the
professional soldier and were not [at] all
impressed with my two pips and neatly pressed
service dress.” Platoon sergeant Carter offered
wise council:
[Carter] told me, quite frankly, that the men were
over-trained and would not brook any nonsense
from a young officer just out of the Officer
Training School; they would take their time to
assess me and until they were satisfied I knew
what I was doing, I would have a pretty rough
time. He suggested I avoid talking about how
great things were in Canada, and the tremendous
war effort the folks were making back home.
On the subject of discipline, I was to interpret
very liberally, and in the men’s favour, any
regulations and rules restraining their extra-
regimental activites, [sic] particularly during the
evening hours.
“This was all very good advice,” Frost recalled,
“but obviously not what I had been taught and
practised since RMC.”16
Throughout the Canadian army the route
march posed an important symbolic measure
of new officers. A former commander of the
Carleton and York Regiment recalled with
disdain how the officers of another unit (a
permanent force one no less) once rode in
vehicles on route marches. His officers marched
with the men.17 The men of the Patricias
demanded no less. Frost was well conditioned
and had little trouble with his first route march:
“I walked up and down the line giving
encouragement to my troops and tried to make
them understand I was concerned for their
welfare.”18 But his first platoon exercise went
badly: “I had difficulty
finding the FUP (Forming Up
Place), was late for the start
line and overloaded an
assault boat, which
promptly swamped. It was a
snafu.” Fully expecting to
receive ‘rockets’ for his
performance, Frost was
“impressed with the calm
and professional way in
which everybody accepted
the mistakes of officers and
men alike.” Even more
important was the way his
platoon viewed his exercise.
“Again there was nothing but
silence, except for Sgt Carter
who indicated my
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The command group from the
Carelton and York Regment during
the attack on Enna, 18 July 1943.
From left to right: Major C.W. Abell,
Lieutenant-Colonel L.D. Tweedie,
Captain J.D. Augherton and
Lieutenant W.W. Wilson. Pte. V.W.
Richard is seated.
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7performance was about par
for the course.”19
On 28 June 1943, a fast
convoy of 12 vessels carrying
most of the Canadian
fighting troops raised anchor
on the Clyde in Scotland. A
series of slower convoys
were already sailing with the
equipment needed by the
more than 26,000
Canadians who would take
part in the Sicilian
campaign.20 As the landing
beaches loomed, previously
small details magnified
Canadian inexperience.
Officers had long been told
that one way to gain an
authority over their men was
to look different from their men. As the convoys
approached ‘Bark West’ on Sicily’s southeast
coast, McDougall of the Seaforths recalled one
of his colleagues:
Mr. McLean joined us in the dark hole of the
Mess Deck just before our serial was called up,
and I remember thinking when I saw him against
the dim blue light of the companionway that he
looked like a Christmas tree. Most of it was from
the waist up: web belt, water-bottle, compass,
entrenching tool, rolled gas-cape, Verey pistol,
map-case, binoculars, Tommy gun, ammunition
clips, small pack on the back, radio set strapped
on the front of his shoulder, then the whole thing
tapering through the steel helmet to the tip of
the radio aerial above his head. A German
wouldn’t need to shoot him; he’d just have to
walk up to him, snick him on the nose, and he’d
fall over and not be able to get up.21
The Canadians were issued tropical kit
enroute to Sicily. The shorts and loose-fitting
shirts took some getting used to, but “it wasn’t
long before we got the ‘hang’ of how to look smart
and soldierly in the new garb.”22 That was a
matter of perspective, as the Canadians soon
gained a reputation for interpreting dress
requirements rather liberally. Ben Malkin of 3rd
Field Regiment, RCA recalled that within a week
of landing in Sicily “we displayed a variety of
clothing that would have done credit to a church
rummage sale. In the Sicilian heat, some men
wore only shorts and gym shoes. Others wore
shorts and boots. Still others wore bush shirts
with shorts, while others, whose skins had
proved especially attractive to the savage Sicilian
mosquitoes, wore long pants with shirts. Finally,
some wore their sleeves rolled up, some
buttoned down.”23
A summer gale and an unreconnoitred sand
bar complicated the Canadian landings on D-
Day, 10 July 1943. Lieutenant Farley Mowat’s
platoon of the Hasty P’s was one of the first onto
the beaches:
Revolver in hand, Tommy gun slung over my
shoulder, web equipment bulging with grenades
and ammo, tin hat pulled firmly down around
my ears, I sprinted to the edge of the rampart
shouting, “Follow me, men!”…and leapt off into
eight feet of water.
Weighted as I was I went down like a stone,
striking the bottom feet-first. So astounded was
I by this unexpected descent into the depths that
I made no attempt to thrash my way back to the
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Members of the Hastings and
Prince Edward Regiment take time
out for a little music. Left to right:
Lieutenant Farley Mowat, Pte. J.
Dalton, Pte. A.R. Beaton and
Captain J.A. Baird.
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8surface. I simply walked straight on until my
head emerged. Then I turned with some faint
thought of shouting warning to my men, and was
in time to see Sgt.-Major Nuttley go off the end
of the ramp with rifle held at arm’s length and
the fingers of his free hand firmly clutching his
nose.24
The beach was largely uncontested, but
delays in the landings put pressure on the junior
officers to get their platoons off the beaches and
onto their initial objectives. Robert McDougall
of the Seaforths later wrote: “The poor bloody
lieutenants run back and forth most of the time
looking worried. So does our company
commander. It’s nice to be a private.”25
After two weeks in the cramped troop ships,
the Canadians began their march north towards
the mountainous centre of the island. Some 500
vehicles and 40 guns had been lost enroute,
leaving the Canadians undergunned and short
of mechanized transport.26 One regimental
history noted that the pressures to push on
created “an intense form of driving leadership,
with experience lacking to keep it always in
perspective.27 On 11 July, the Edmontons ended
a long, dusty march at Ispica, where naval guns
helped force the town’s surrender. (For the next
month, Ispica came under the control of a
twenty-one-year old Town Major, Sydney Frost).28
The RCR’s occupied Ragusa the next day, but
the divisional march continued through the
searing heat and dust. Correspondent Peter
Stursberg wrote of the “powdery white dust…
[that] made the sunburned soldiers look deathly
pale, like ghosts.”29 Having loaned vehicles to
their sister regiments, the Commanding Officer
of the 48th Highlanders admitted that his men
suffered heat casualties and were among “a very
large number of stragglers.”30
On 13 July, 8th Army Commander Bernard
Law Montgomery ordered a 36-hour rest north
for the Canadians at Giarratana. Monty’s visit
to the Canadians helped forge his reputation;
Wallace recalled the general asking if they had
enough beer.31 McDougall thought the general
was “lean and hard, has gimlet eyes, and gives
off confidence like Lana Turner gives off sex.”32
The general had sharper words for the
Canadians in his diary: “The Canadian Div had
definitely to be rested; the men were not fit and
they suffered severely from the hot sun and many
got badly burnt; generally, officers and men are
too fat and they want to get some flesh off and to
harden themselves.” He later confided in his
diary: “They are a grand Division and when we
get them tough and hard and some of the fat off
them, they will be absolutely first class.”33
Montgomery likely knew little of the long sea
journey or the loss of transport. Both the 51st
Highland Division on the Canadian right and the
45th US ‘Thunderbird’ Division on the left were
highly mobile – “to the Canadians it looked as
though every American soldier had his own
jeep.”34
Montgomery’s faith in the Canadians would
play out in the coming weeks. Frustrated by the
failure of his 8th Army to capture Catania on
Sicily’s east coast, (and eager that his army
would play the central role in the capture of
Sicily) Montgomery shifted efforts to the centre
of the island, towards the town of Enna which
formed the hub of the Sicilian road system. While
the Canadians were marching north, the 45th
US Division had driven inland to the British-
American boundary, pushing the Germans onto
the Canadian front. Rather than allow the
Americans to press on, Montgomery ordered his
XXX Corps, including the Canadians, to drive
west and north into the strength of the German
defences. Despite shortages of transport, armour
and artillery, the Canadians were to try to
outflank the Germans through the dust,
mountains and dry river beds of central Sicily.
North of the Canadians lay the spectacular
hilltops on which stood the villages and towns
of Caltagirone, Piazza Armerina, Valguarnera,
Enna, Assoro and Leonforte. In each, units of
the Herman Goring Division established
rearguards, using the heights to deny the
Canadians the roads heading east towards the
Catania plain.35
Caltagirone “was a gift” to the 48th
Highlanders, falling with little fighting.36 But the
push towards Valguarnera found the infantry in
a series of isolated actions often unable to deploy
supporting arms. At Piazza Armerina for
example, the guns of the Three Rivers tanks
could not be raised high enough to engage the
German positions in support of the Edmontons.
A number of the division’s anti-tank guns were
lost enroute; those that made it were often
difficult to deploy. Tooley noted, for example,
that the anti-tank platoon of the CYR did not
fire throughout the Sicilian campaign. And when
8
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91st Brigade was repelled on its push towards
Valguarnera on 17 July, the infantry found that
the tank of the artillery Forward Observation
Artillery [FOO] could not cross the harsh terrain.
Neither could the tracked carriers with the 3-
inch mortars and those notoriously unreliable
wireless sets.37
In spite of these challenges, there were
spectacular successes. On 18 July, the
Canadians turned away from Enna to launch
attacks eastward towards the imposing heights
that held the towns of Leonforte and Assoro. The
story of the Hasty P’s battle for Assoro is the
stuff of legend. While scouting the operation, the
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce
Sutcliffe, was killed. The battalion’s Intelligence
officer, Captain Battle Cockin died later. As the
son of a former Governor-General, Major John
Buchan, The Lord Tweedsmuir, seemed an
unlikely choice as Second-in-Command of the
Plough Jockeys from the north shore of Lake
Ontario. But Tweedsmuir was up to the
challenge, leading a daring night attack on the
Assoro feature from the east with an ‘assault
company’ led by “A” Company commander Alex
Campbell. Aided by diversions from the south-
west, the men quietly twisted across the valley
beneath the Assoro peak. They then discovered
a narrow goat path along the cliff face to the
heights above. In the dark, surprise was
complete. A meagre No. 56 set that had gone up
the cliff on a soldier’s back allowed Tweedsmuir
to direct the guns of the 7th Medium Regiment
to knock out an enemy battery and prevent any
further attempts by the Germans to retake the
village. Low on food and ammunition, the Hasty
Ps were finally relieved by the RCRs. With
support from the 48th Highlanders (whose men
also scaled cliffs west of Assoro) and a squadron
of the Three Rivers Regiment, Assoro fell on 22
July 1943.38
Even our official historians gush in their
praise of the battle for Assoro. William
McAndrew has concluded: “The Hastings’
achievement was remarkable, accomplished
once more with intelligent, imaginative and bold
manoeuvre.” Major G.W.L. Nicholson, the author
of Canada’s official history of the Canadian army
in Italy noted firmly: “The seizure of the Assoro
pinnacle…was as significant to the Canadian
Division’s advance as it was dramatic, for it upset
the whole German plan of defence on that front,
and thus hastened the fall of Leonforte.” 39
Perhaps, but Canadian intelligence officers
concluded at the time that the Germans were
resolved to put up a ‘resolute defence’ at
Leonforte.40 Brigadier Vokes first gave the
Seaforth Highlanders the job of attacking up the
only, winding road to the town. When short
rounds fell into the Seaforth’s headquarters,
Vokes delayed the action and gave the lead to
the Edmontons under Lieutenant-Colonel J.C.
Jefferson. All four of Jefferson’s rifle companies
went forward under the crunch of mortars,
machine guns and a heavy artillery barrage that
forced the Germans to the rear of the town. But
until the engineers could repair a blown bridge
on the approaching road, the Edmontons had
only their personal weapons to withstand the
German counterattacks. Even the PIATs were
useless for as Bill Cromb, one of the company
commanders remembered, “the soldier who had
the fuses was either wounded or dead.”41 The
wireless operators tried to extend antennae from
the rooftops, but their signals could not reach
Vokes’ brigade headquarters. The Edmontons
were cut off. Colonel Jefferson had to entrust a
note addressed “to any British or Canadian
officer” to an Italian boy who made it through
the lines. The next morning Captain Rowan
Coleman of the Patricias led a “flying column”
to relieve the Eddies, followed closely by four
Three Rivers tanks and a troop of anti-tank guns.
The fighting in Leonforte’s narrow streets
continued throughout the day, costing 2nd
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Brigadier J.C. Jefferson (right), shown here in Normandy
while commanding 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, was
the commander of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment in Sicily.
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Brigade over 161 casualties, including 56
fatalities.42
Intelligence, imagination and boldness easily
describe the battles for both Assoro and
Leonforte. But as historian Shaun Brown has
noted, an infantry advance with little support
from the other arms was to become a familiar
pattern in the coming months. “The result was
heavy casualties and effective enemy
counterattacks, which slowed the progress of
battle.”43
For this reason it is likely that General
Simonds decided on a very different approach
for the Canadians’ next battle some 12
kilometres east of Leonforte at Agira. This time
Simonds outlined an elaborate artillery
programme, “all the trimmings” according to the
war diarist of the RCR, the first of Howard
Graham’s three infantry battalions who
advanced beyond the village of Nissoria, but no
further. Agira remained in German hands.
There is no lack of finger-pointing over the
battle for Agira. Simonds agreed with divisional
intelligence who echoed German prisoners’
judgments that the infantry did not advance
quickly enough under the artillery fire. Howard
Graham disputed Simonds’ assessment, writing
years later: “I still resent the effort to justify a
bad plan by putting blame for its failure on the
backs of the troops.” Though Graham can also
take responsibility for what happened to his
brigade, most commentators agree that the plan
was overly ambitious. Even Simonds’
sympathetic biographer, Dominick Graham,
concedes that the plan “…seemed excessive when
the advance was led by a single battalion, the
RCR, and the location of the enemy was not
precisely known.”44
William McAndrew is also critical of
Simonds. McAndrew argues that the general
tried to impose a rigid fire plan on an enemy
and terrain that would not oblige him: “Little
was known of the German dispositions, and no
amount of fire support could neutralize an area
several miles long and a few wide. The result,
an uneasy compromise between a formal set
piece attack, and an advance to contact on a one-
battalion front, left the division punching in air.”
But McAndrew goes further, arguing that such
an inflexible fire plan “seemed to induce a tactical
outlook which restrained the initiative on which
battlefield manoeuvre depends.” He asks “Could
the butcher’s bill, at Agira or elsewhere, have
been reduced with another, less mechanistic, less
predictable approach to battle? It is impossible
to say for sure, of course,…”45
It is possible to speculate. Galloway led “B”
Company of the RCR at Agira. His company faced
“intense mortar and MG fire” just east of
Nissoria. The unit did not turn or find shelter,
though he admits rather sheepishly “we had no
other choice. We had to keep going, though I
remember cowering momentarily in successive
gullies which ran across our line of advance.”46
Galloway had good reason to feel exposed, for a
breeze thinned much of the smoke fired to
obscure the battlefield on that hot July day. From
his perch back in Assoro, Simonds called for
more smoke but under the conditions the
Canadians met at Nissoria it is understandable
that the infantry lost their timed artillery
concentrations. The 18-sets again proved faulty
and communication broke down throughout the
day. Lieutenant-Colonel Crowe went forward in
the late afternoon to find his companies and urge
them on. He was killed, leaving three of his
company commanders who had fought on past
Nissoria (possibly within two miles of Agira) to
decide their next action.47
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The three companies of the RCRs spent the
night in their forward positions before receiving
orders orders to pull back. In McAndrew’s view,
the company commanders “reacted as their
doctrine, training, and orders instructed them.
Unfortunately, these erred on the side of caution,
control, and the dictates of an orderly battlefield,
rather than boldness, initiative, and chance.
What soldiers do when control and
communication fail is surely the test of any
tactical doctrine.”48 This was by no means an
orderly battlefield. The RCR’s orders to withdraw
came after the Hastings and Prince Edward
Regiment had failed to push on to Agira through
heavy machine gun and mortar fire, and with
no artillery support. Lord Tweedsmuir was just
one of his unit’s 80 casualties. The 48th
Highlanders would also go forward under
artillery cover, but would be unable to take the
crest against the weight of German weaponry.
Historians are free to interpret this first battle
for Agira as a failure of tactical doctrine, but the
men on the ground had few choices.
By any measure, the Canadians’ second
battle for Agira showed the strength of a tactical
doctrine that hinged on the boldness of young
officers on the ground. Drawing lessons from
1st Brigade’s attack, this operation by Vokes’s
2nd Brigade afforded a much better balance of
firepower and manoeuvre warfare. It began on
the night of 26 July behind a 28-stage barrage
that more than doubled the rounds per gun laid
down two days before. Further supported by
anti-tank guns and tanks, two companies of
Patricias captured their first objective (‘Lion’)
that night with little difficulty. The guns then
stopped for twenty minutes to allow two other
companies of Patricias to push onto the next
ridge further east (‘Tiger’). In the darkness, the
men of “A” and “B” Companies lost their way
and could only listen as the timed barrage
passed them by.49
Tiger ridge was still in doubt at midnight on
the 26th when Vokes ordered Lieutenant-Colonel
Hoffmeister’s Seaforths forward. With a troop
of Shermans and anti-tank guns, the Seaforths’
“A” and “C”companies climbed onto the ridge
and with the Patricias won the objective. Already
learning to react to German tactics, the
Canadians rushed anti-tank guns forward to
hold the position against counterattack.50
The task to capture the next ridgeline,
codenamed Grizzly, fell to the Seaforths’ “A”
Company under Major Henry ‘Budge’ Bell-Irving.
Supported by the Seaforths’ “C” Company, a
troop of tanks and the invaluable artillery FOO,
Bell-Irving’s 8 Platoon fired at the enemy on the
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top of Grizzly while his 7 and 9 Platoons worked
through the orchards and terraced vineyards to
outflank the hill from the south. In a move
reminiscent of the Hasty P’s climb at Assoro, a
small party of “A” Company men climbed the
300 foot heights and took the position by
surprise. Low on ammunition and eventually
without wireless, Bell-Irving’s men held their
position through the night of the 27th.51 Said
McDougall of the Seaforths: “It was an uneasy
night for a handful of weary men.”52
The following spring Major Bell-Irving
presented his account of the battle for Agira to
young officers then preparing for the invasion
of Northern Europe. He gave this advice:
This short history of “A” Company does, at a
low level, illustrate something of what infantry
can do in infantry country such as our battalion
faced in front of Agira. The performance of the
company depended entirely on freedom of
manoeuvre, freedom of time, and the delegation
of initiative to subordinate commanders. It
seems clear that Western Europe will provide at
least some country more like Sicily than North
Africa. If that is so, I suggest that you give the
infantryman his head, make some F.O.O.s walk,
and let the guns support the infantry’s need of
the moment.53
It was good advice, and it
could have been
strengthened by numerous
episodes throughout the
campaign. The official
history describes the actions
of Lieutenant Guy of the
West Nova Scotia Regiment
during 3rd Brigade’s fighting
on the Catenanuova
bridgehead in late July. With
his company commander
wounded by short fire,
Lieutenant Guy led the
company onto the objective,
but it was forced off by a
German counterattack. Guy
had no FOO with him, and
he had little experience
observing and directing artillery fire. But with
some “quick instructions” over the wireless from
Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert, Guy “began giving the
artillery targets well away from his positions and
correcting these as he observed the fall of the
shells.” In that self-deprecating way that was so
much a style of leadership back then, Guy later
commented, “By some good fortune, fire was
brought down on the enemy and forced them to
retreat.”54
Too often that kind of leadership came at a
price. The Sicilian campaign was not yet over
when General Montgomery reviewed the Sicilian
campaign for “My dear Brookie,” General Alan
Brooke. Officer casualties were of particular
interest. Montgomery noted that “A marked
feature is the high proportion of officers killed
to other ranks killed – as high as 1 to 6 in some
units; and averaging 1 to 9 in the whole army. It
has never been more than 1 to 15 before.” 55
Canadian infantry battalions in Sicily lost 40
Canadian officers and 522 other ranks killed
during the Sicilian campaign, a ratio of 1
Canadian officer killed to every 13 Canadian
other ranks.56
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Lieutentant-Colonel R.M. Crowe
and Major J.H.W. Pope of the
Royal Canadian Regiment
checking a map outside of Piazza
Armerina, 17 July 1943. Both men
suffered heroic but unnecessary
deaths during the campaign.
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Firm conclusions are hard to draw when
these figures are weighed against the fate of
individual battalions. Officer casualties
fluctuated dramatically between units. The West
Nova Scotia Regiment, for example, lost 1 officer
and 26 other ranks killed. The Seaforth
Highlanders were the hardest hit, with 21 of its
38 officers suffering casualties (including six who
died).57 In August 1943, Major Douglas Forin of
the Seaforths wrote to his wife: “Jack Conway
has just come in to BHQ, [Battalion
Headquarters] where he is taking over
Intelligence Officer duties; he is one of two
surviving subalterns with whom we landed.”58
The Seaforth’s grim toll prompted one of its
survivors to consider that the unit’s casualties
were due in part to the “great conscientiousness
(at times excessive in these early days) of officers
and N.C.O.s.”59 The Seaforths’ officers were not
the only ones who may have shown ‘excessive’
gallantry. Galloway and the RCR’s official
historian agree that the deaths of Colonel Crowe
at Nissoria and Major Pope, who died earlier
near Valguarnera, were “heroic” but
unnecessary.60
If officer casualties are an imperfect measure
of officer performance, officer removals are an
equally uncertain gauge. In early August, the
Patricias lost their CO, Lieutenant-Colonel
Lindsay after Brigadier Vokes thought he
needlessly delayed an attack on Monte Seggio.
For some, including Frost who was there, the
episode reflected badly on Vokes, not Lindsay.
Also in August, Brigadier Penhale relieved
Lieutenant-Colonel Tweedie of his command of
the Carleton and York Regiment. As a result, at
least two other officers, including the Second-
in-Command, requested that they be posted to
other units.61 Were these ineffective officers?
We do know (but seldom acknowledge) that
from 1st Division’s Sicilian experience emerged
a core of men who would play a substantial role
leading the rest of the Canadian army. From the
Patricias, Ron Watterman would take command
of the West Nova Scotia Regiment, while Rowan
Coleman (who won a Military Cross at Leonforte)
would lead the Lincoln and Welland Regiment
in Northwest Europe. He would succeed another
veteran of that battle, Bill Cromb of the
Edmontons. Cromb’s Commanding Officer, J.C.
Jefferson, would command 10th Infantry
Brigade, 4th Armoured Division for its entire
time in battle. Ian Johnston, CO of the 48th
Highlanders, went on to command 11th Brigade
in 1944. J.P.E. Bernatchez, who led the Van Doos
through Sicily and Italy in 1943 would also
command a brigade. His successor, Jean Allard,
would lead the Van Doos for all of 1944 before
he too became a brigadier in 1945.
From Sicily emerged three men who would
lead Canadian divisions in battle. One was 2nd
Brigade commander Chris Vokes. Another was
Bruce Matthews, who rose from divisional
artillery commander to lead the 2nd Division in
late 1944. And then there was Bertram Meryl
Hoffmeister, like Matthews another pre-war
militiaman who rose from the cadet corps to
command the Seaforth Highlanders during the
Sicilian campaign. Described as a “classic leader,
someone men wanted to follow,” Hoffmeister
replaced Vokes as 2nd Brigade commander in
November 1943. Months after the grim battle
for Ortona where his brigade played a crucial
role, Hoffmeister became a Major-General and
took command of 5th Armoured Division in
March 1944, or as it would soon be known,
‘Hoffy’s Mighty Maroon Machine.”62
Canada’s military historians have for too long
argued that Guy Simonds and lots of firepower
were central to the success of Canadian
operations. Neither was enough. Leadership
mattered. In the face of new weapons, new
organizations, a long and dangerous sea voyage
and unfamiliar terrain that too often made
wireless sets useless and coordination difficult,
an enormous burden fell on the army’s junior
leadership (both commissioned and non-
commissioned) to see the battle through. Sixty
years on we should remember that.
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